Manschreck implied that that is precisely what Luther and Melanchthon had had in mind; for he writes that "if one insists that justification is by faith alone, everything else is adiaphoristic.
,nu
To judge from such remarks, Luther and Melanchthon did indeed teach what the Tridentine canon condemned. But was that actually the case? It would seem not.
11 From its position in the Tridentine text, it is clear that the aforementioned canon had reference not to the Reformers' doctrine about "original justification" (the alien righteousness imputed to man) but to their notion of "sanctification" (the "new being" which comes with the appropriation of Christ's righteousness). The same must probably be assumed also of the remarks by Street and Manschreck, since both Luther and Melanchthon were so clear in teaching that in the process of original justification every human action apart from faith ushered coram Deo not only is of no value (notwithstanding its "natural" goodness) but is positively sinful, and therefore not to be conceived of as indifferent. Like the Tridentine canon, therefore, Street and Manschreck probably had in mind only to suggest that according to Luther and Melanchthon everything but faith is indifferent for the Christian insofar as he is a "new man." But can one make even such an assertion?
By reason of his faith in Christ, Melanchthon wrote, the Christian is no longer a slave of the law; the law has been abrogated in his regard, and not only the judicial and ceremonial laws but the moral law as well.
12 He becomes, in the words of Luther, "the free lord of all, subject to none." 13 No longer does he have to prove himself worthy under the law. Although he remains a sinner, he need not despair. The accusations of the law, of the devil, of the pope, of the self, or of anyone else, can no longer overwhelm him. By faith the righteousness of Christ is now his righteousness. His sin will no longer be held against him. He has been accepted as he is. Having recognized God, he can forget himself. His is a share in the lordship of Christ, and he finds that now "everything is free 10 Ibid. "It may be noted that Schmid drew the same conclusion, but made little effort to substantiate it, being more concerned with the philosophical dimensions of adiaphorism. His preoccupation with the latter may be explained in part by the fact that his contemporaries, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schleiermacher, were also airing their opinions on the theory at about the same time. See I. Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, ed. K. Vorländer (Hamburg, 1956) and nothing necessary."
14 Such, according to Luther and Melanchthon, is the radical freedom enjoyed by every Christian. But is it of an adiaphoristic sort?
In its original conception among the ancient Cynic and Stoic philosophers, the term adiaphoron had been used to designate a thing which, when considered in itself, was never of such decisive value or disvalue as not to be able to be rendered either good or evil in the concrete by the human intention. 16 Such an understanding of the term was introduced into Christian thought by the Alexandrians Clement and Origen, 16 and received some attention from other early Church Fathers like John Chrysostom, John Cassian, and Augustine. 17 During the High Middle Ages it figured considerably in the long debate over the intrinsic morality of human actions that was started by Abelard and reached a conclusion of sorts with Thomas Aquinas.
18 By the late Middle Ages, however, most of the discussion of adiaphora had shifted to the more specifically theological line of adiaphoristic thought, which had also been under development since apostolic times. 19 Along this latter line the emphasis was not so much upon the intrinsic morality of things in themselves as upon the relationship of the person to them, with the result that an adiaphoron came to be defined also as a thing that is "permitted" 20 or "free," because it has been "neither commanded nor prohibited" by the external operations of divine law as revealed in the New Testament.
It was precisely this latter theological definition of the adiaphoron which found expression among almost all the sixteenth-century magisterial Reformers, and therefore also in the aforementioned Tridentine canon ("... indifferentia, ñeque praecepta, ñeque prohibita, sed libera"). But if one so defines an adiaphoron, then it clearly cannot be employed to describe the whole of that "radical freedom" which, according to Luther and Melanchthon, is the Christian's by way of his lordship over all things; for even though he shares in Christ's lordship, -It should also be pointed out here that it was not really until the sixteenth century that the theory of adiaphorism came to be applied to the realm of doctrine. During the earlier centuries, however, a variety of distinctions were being drawn by one or another theologian which tended to favor some sort of hierarchical evaluation of Christian doctrine. Such, e.g., had been the Pauline distinctions between the kerygma and didache, and between the "milk" and "meat" of Christ's message, both of which distinctions were echoed repeatedly by the early Church Fathers, to some extent inspired the formulation of the Creeds, and by the time of Augustine began to give rise to the more technical distinction between explicit and implicit faith, which, while presupposing the "unity of faith," nevertheless made allowances for the "weak." Not surprisingly, what with its inherent and charitable concern for the "weak" and its emphasis upon the lightness of the Christian burden, the theory of adiaphorism, when it finally came to be applied by William Tyndale, John Frith, and other English Reformers to the realm of doctrine, hearkened back, at least implicitly, to such distinctions (see, e.g., W. the Christian still, according to the two Reformers, has certain things commanded and certain things forbidden him. To demonstrate this point, and to discover finally where it is that the Reformers do actually locate their adiaphorism, it will be necessary to review the second half of Luther's paradoxical formula of Christian liberty, namely, that the Christian who is the free lord of all is also and for that very reason "the perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all."
21
Emancipated from the curse of the law, and the chains of his slavery to self thereby broken, the man of faith, Luther said, has been set free toward his neighbor and toward the world. 22 No longer does he need to use his neighbor as party to some moralistic scheme of proving himself worthy.
28 Nor need he any longer search out some especially "holy" vocation by which to gain self-respect and divine approval.
24 Now instead, his love of neighbor can be genuinely altruistic and expressed freely and confidently in the ordinary "stations" of life.
26
Such service will not be a "work of the law" but a "work of grace," 26 the result of the man of faith having submitted himself to the creative lordship of Christ. Possessed and moved by Christ's Spirit, he will no longer need the law's "demands and warnings."
27 His life of love will be a spontaneous one, inspired and guided from within. As Althaus has put it, Luther's man of faith lives "in theonomous creativity."
28 He is not bound legalistically to any external law-not the Decalogue, nor even the New Testament "commandments."
29 Indeed, to the extent that he lives in the power of the Spirit, the man of faith can write and rewrite his own law in accordance with the specific situation within which he finds himself.
30
Luther and Melanchthon were not, however, antinomianists. Only the man who thinks that sin is once and for ever behind him, they said, will consider himself no longer in any need whatever of the law. 31 But in their view the Christian remains at once a righteous man and a sinner. Thus, for all their talk of the abrogation of the law, Luther and Melanchthon would also conceive of the law as continuing to play a role in the life of Trillhaas, Ethik (Berlin, 1959) (Göttingen, 1968) pp. 62-63. the Christian. Not to mention its "civil function," 32 the law will continue to function "theologically," they said, by serving to remind the Christian of the twofold sense in which, notwithstanding his righteousness, he remains a sinner, i.e., "totally," insofar as while living "in Christ" he remains "an sich," 33 in his own "empirical sinful existence," 34 and "partially," to the extent that the "flesh," the "old man," persists in warring against the "spirit," or the "new man" now abuilding within him under the impetus of faith. 35 Cognizant of the "good news" of Christ's saving grace, the Christian will not let such a function of the law drive him, as it did before his reception of the gospel, into despair. It will, however, goad him into renewing ever again his original act of trust in God, and into carrying on the daily struggle against the "flesh."
36
But there is, according to Luther and Melanchthon, still a further function of the law in the Christian's life. 37 To the extent that he remains "partially holy" and "partially sinful," his discernment of God's will is clouded. 38 In his efforts to live a life of love such as will not jeopardize the unity of Christian ethical judgment, it will be necessary, therefore, that he take into serious account the moral "norms" or directives to be found in divine law. 39 Among the latter are to be counted the Ten Commandments, 40 and even more so the "new decalogues" by which Christ and his apostles brought into sharper focus the original intention of the Decalogue 41 and, among other things, delineated the various "stations" in the context of which Christians are to work out their love for one another. 42 To avoid giving the impression that such directives are "legally" binding upon the Christian or necessary, in a moralistic sense, to salvation, Luther chose to refer to them not as laws but as 
59
"commands," "precepts," "exhortations," "remedies," and so forth.
48
Furthermore, and probably for the same reason, he seems never to have used the expression "the third function of the law." 44 Still, like Melanchthon and other of the Reformers whose emphasis upon the law's "third function" was more explicit, Luther clearly deemed it necessary for Christians to look to the biblical commands and prohibitions as to a criterion by which to know what sort of "good works" God requires.
45 "In the New Testament," Luther wrote, "all those things are shown which ought to be done and ought not to be done." 46 What, therefore, the Scripture commands, the Christian "must" do; what is therein forbidden, he "must" omit.
47
As will be seen shortly, however, Luther and Melanchthon were also very much aware that the commands and prohibitions of Scripture do not cover the whole of Christian life and worship. And it was precisely this realm left uncovered by Scripture, and only this realm, which they identified as being adiaphoristic. That those things and actions belonging to such a realm were not to be considered "sources of justification" was presupposed. But this had nothing immediately to do with their definition as adiaphora. Their adiaphoristic character was derived rather by Luther and Melanchthon from the fact that such matters had been "neither commanded nor forbidden" by the divine law revealed in Scripture.
48
By thus identifying the outer limits of adiaphoristic liberty with the biblical commands and prohibitions, Luther and Melanchthon were left with the problem of having to specify exactly what Scripture had "neither commanded nor forbidden." In that regard, it was recognized, first of all, that there exists a whole realm of things and actions over which the Christian has been explicitly "permitted" by Scripture to exercise freedom of choice. As Melanchthon put it, the Spirit cannot be tied down by the sort of distinctions of places and times, persons and things, which characterized the old Judaic ceremonial and judicial codes. 49 Hence the Christian finds that under the New Law he is allowed to decide for himself whether to marry or not to marry, when or when not to partake of this or that food or drink and so forth. 60 In contrast to the dictates of the Decalogue and the New Testament "commandments," all such matters are in themselves adiaphora, 51 and concrete determinations in their regard need not be observed "by necessity."
52
In addition to those matters explicitly permitted by Scripture, however, were many others concerning which the Scriptures have left no explicit direction at all. Were such matters also to be considered adiaphora? Already in the third century a controversy had arisen in the Church over how this "silence" of Scripture was to be interpreted. Some Christians had argued then that attendance at the pagan "spectacles," or the wearing of the laurel wreath, were permitted because they had been neither commanded nor prohibited in Scripture. position, in other words, that "whatever is not forbidden is certainly permitted." 64 Tertullian argued otherwise. It is easy, he said, for someone to ask "Where in Scripture are we forbidden to wear a crown?" 55 But those who thus demand the support of a scriptural text for a view they do not hold ought to be willing to submit their own position to the same scriptural text. Can they show a text, he asked, which says we should be crowned?
56 But if they cannot, what is the rule to be? For his own part, Tertullian said, he rejects the position that "whatever is not forbidden is certainly permitted" and holds rather that "whatever is not clearly permitted is forbidden." 57 Both positions found adherents among the sixteenth-century Reformers.
Among the latter, some, like the Anabaptists, were inclined to think that in the New Testament the Church could find a paradigmatic formula for the whole of its life and worship. Thus, to their way of thinking, for one thing or another to be permitted in the Church it had necessarily to enjoy the express sanction of Scripture. Whatever lacked such explicit sanction had to be considered forbidden.
58
To others of the Reformers, including Luther and Melanchthon, however, such a conclusion seemed absurd. On occasion, as for example when Luther wrote in his 1520 treatise on the Mass that the closer our Masses are to the first Mass of Christ, the better they are, 59 the two Wittenberg Reformers could also give expression to a conviction that the Church and its structures ought to be brought into a condition of positive accord with the New Testament. But such a conviction never led them to a position of biblical reductionism. Were one to contend that all is forbidden which is not explicitly permitted by Scripture, it would be necessary, Luther said, to observe the Eucharistie service nowhere but in Jerusalem, or even to refrain from it altogether, since the Scripture does not state whether red or white wine, wheat rolls or barley bread, had been used by Christ and the apostles at the Last Supper.
60 That being absurd, Such a conclusion struck not only at the position of the biblical reductionists but also against those papalists who were inclined to compensate for the "silence" of Scripture on one or another matter by appealing to the so-called "unwritten apostolic traditions" 63 or to the supposed prerogative of Church authorities to bind subjects under pain of mortal sin in matters not laid down in Scripture. 64 To this papalist way of thinking-as evidenced, for example, by the English trio of More, Fisher, and Henry VIII-the Spirit was at work no less in tradition than in the written word of Scripture. 66 Far from being mere "optional human inventions," therefore, the "unwritten traditions" and other laws and ceremonies sanctioned by Church authorities down through the centuries are "the inventions of the holy spirit,"
66 and as such may very well bind Christian consciences under pain of sin 67 or be considered "necessary to salvation." 68 As will be seen at a later point in this study, Luther and Melanchthon did not deny as such the right of Church (and civil) authorities to legislate in the realm of adiaphora. They did, however, emphatically reject as preposterous and blasphemous any claim that such laws could bind the Christian in conscience, as if obedience to them were necessary to salvation.
69
It is clear from the above, therefore, that Christian liberty, as it was conceived by Luther and Melanchthon, enjoys a variety of dimensions which, while closely interrelated, are not to be confused. There is, in the first place, that radical emancipation of the Christian from the con straint of the law, on the basis of which he can claim a lordship over all things. This lordship, however, will express itself paradoxically in a life of obedient service which, while motivated and directed from within, must nonetheless follow the external operations of divine law as revealed in the New Testament. Such is the second dimension of his liberty. The third dimension arises out of the fact that the commands and prohibitions of Scripture do not cover the whole of Christian life and worship. There is a realm of things and actions concerning which Scripture either gives no direction at all or explicitly permits the Christian to decide for himself which direction to take in order to best serve his God and neighbor. The adiaphoristic liberty that obtains for the Christian therein clearly presupposes but is by no means simply coterminous with (as Eck, the 
64

THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
Tridentine Fathers, and others seemed to think) the first dimension of his freedom.
70
That Luther and Melanchthon would conceive of adiaphora as taking their definition from the fact of their not being covered by the external operations of divine law implied that all such things and actions were by definition nonessential to the Spirit's work of love in the new man. It did not mean, however, that adiaphora were for that reason altogether exempt from the inner law of love. Quite the contrary. One might marry or not marry, eat or not eat meat, sing or not sing in church, and so forth; but whatever one does in the realm of adiaphora must always be done within the bounds of charity. In other words, there are also, according to Luther and Melanchthon, limits upon adiaphoristic freedom which arise, as it were, from within.
In the first place, the law of charity will require that in his exercise of adiaphoristic freedom the Christian evidence a concern for those sheep of Christ's flock who stand in danger of falling prey to the "Romish wolves."
71 Down through the centuries, the Augsburg Confession claimed, 72 all Christianity had come to be thought of as an observance of certain holy days, rites, fasts, and attire, 78 with the result that the gospel was obscured, human traditions were preferred to God's commandments, and great damage was done to men's consciences, terrified as they had become at the thought of omitting one or another tradition that was said to be necessary to salvation or the perfection of the spiritual life.
74 Those who would seek to perpetuate such a state of affairs must be confronted boldly, "lest many others be snared by their impious views," Luther said. 76 In inexperienced should be instructed that they commit no sin in violating human traditions.
7
· If the chance to escape the "popish tyranny" is afforded them, they should be told to take it.
80
In fighting against the wolves, however, one should take care, Luther warned, that one is actually fighting "for the sheep and not against them." 81 There are many, he observed, who, on hearing of Christian liberty, promptly set out to prove that they are free men and Christians only by despising and criticizing the existing traditions and human laws, as if they were Christians because they do not fast when others do, omit the customary prayers, and ridicule the precepts of men, while paying little heed to all else that pertains to Christianity.
82 By insisting upon making an uninhibited, public display of their freedom, such individuals err in the same way as those who cling to the ceremonies; they attach too much importance to matters which in themselves are of little account.
88
It is right, Luther said, to boldly confront the obstinate papists with the fact of Christian liberty, but care must also be taken lest in the process the "weak" who lack a mature understanding of the faith be scandalized. 84 Thus the law of charity may occasionally require that in the presence of "weaker" brethren the Christian, following the example of the Apostle Paul, bear with tyranny and exercise his adiaphoristic liberty only in secret, keeping it between himself and God. 86 Similarly, it may sometimes be necessary, Luther and Melanchthon said, to limit the exercise of one's freedom and bear with tyranny so as to avoid disturbing the peace 88 Melanchthon chose to suffer the imposition of the Leipzig Interim by Charles V in 1549. 88 Because, to his view, the latter did not compromise the essential Protestant doctrine of solafideism, and because the ceremonies it sanctioned were supposedly of an indifferent nature, Melanchthon thought that the Interim could be tolerated. "In order to retain the essentials," he wrote, "we are less strict about the nonessentials." 89 Melanchthon's conclusion in this regard was promptly challenged, however, from many other quarters of the Lutheran Church. Hence the so-called Adiaphoristic Controversy which was to rage on for years among Lutheran theologians.
90
The most outspoken of Melanchthon's critics was Mathias Flacius Illyricus. 91 Flacius did not deny the existence as such of adiaphora 92 but only insisted that "true" and "false" adiaphora be clearly distinguished. True adiaphora, he said, take their origin ultimately from God Himself, but impious abominations that must be avoided by every means."
104
Chief among the many arguments introduced by Flacius to prove that the Interim ceremonies were not edifying but "pseudadiaphora," was his contention that "ceremonies are the principal sinews of popery, and that in them is to be found the very sum of the Roman religion."
106 Charles V's attempt to impose the ceremonies must, therefore, be viewed, Flacius said, as being in reality an endeavor to re-establish the papacy and all its "superstitious beliefs."
106 To submit to the ceremonies under such conditions would, according to Flacius, inevitably imply a loss of faith.
107
Hence, far from edifying, the ceremonies would, in the situation at hand, greatly scandalize the Christian community and on those grounds must be rejected as "pseudadiaphora. But if Melanchthon perhaps failed to take into adequate account the special conditions obtaining during the Interim, it is also true that Flacius' arguments were such as to leave little room for an adiaphoristic appraisal of the ceremonies even outside a period of persecution. Not surprisingly, much of Flacius' support during the Interim controversy came from the likes of John Epinus, who were either opposed to the theory of adiaphorism altogether or wanted to keep its application within the narrowest of limits at all times, not only during a "time of confession."
118 In fact, many of Flacius' arguments, like his contention, for example, that ceremonies are the "main sinews of popery," or that ceremonies once abused by idolatry cannot be considered adiaphora, could have been lifted right off the pages of the antiadiaphorist literature which William Turner, John Bale, and others had promulgated during the course of their hot pursuit of the "Romish Foxe" in England not many years prior to the period of the Interim.
114 Furthermore, the Flacian conclusion that adiaphora must be "edifying" by definition (a notion which seems to defy rational explanation 116 ) would become a basic ingredient of the "puritan" attack against the "indifferent mean" of the Anglican Church.
Our concern here, however, is not to choose a winner out of the host of disputants involved in the Adiaphoristic Controversy, but simply to highlight the sort of maze into which the adiaphoristic approach, for all its apparent simplicity, could lead the Reformers. Of course, the period of the Interim was exceptional, hardly the best of times, therefore, to test the worth of such an approach. But trying to keep the exercise of adiaphoristic liberty within the boundaries of love was no mean task for the Reformers at any time. Hence the need for the Reformers to spell out time and again the following limits or guidelines for the proper use of adiaphoristic liberty within the Christian community itself, and outside times of persecution.
Once again, the primary emphasis was upon a charitable consideration of the weaker brethren. The Christian must not look only upon his own strength but upon his brothers' also, and act accordingly.
116 Keeping in mind the distinction between those things that are "free" and those that are "necessary," 117 and recognizing that not everyone matures in his faith at the same pace, 118 the Christian will not try to force upon individuals changes for which they are not yet prepared.
119 Those who, like Karlstadt, 120 would insist that certain human traditions must be abolished and rashly proceed to do so, err no less, Luther said, than the papists. Theirs is simply a new type of tyranny. The papists destroy freedom by commanding, constraining, and compelling Christians to do things which God has not commanded or required; Karlstadt and his kind do so by forbidding, preventing, and hindering the Christian from doing that which is neither prohibited nor forbidden by God. 121 The Christian should avoid both errors and stay to the "middle path," along the lines of which one neither clings to the traditions as being in themselves necessary to salvation nor insists upon their abolition as necessary to salvation. 122 The important thing is to remove the "poison" from the human traditions, i.e., the notion that they are binding upon consciences and necessary to salvation. 128 Once that is done, it matters little as such whether the traditions be removed or retained.
124 Adiaphoristic freedom is primarily a matter between God and the Christian, not between the Christian and his fellow man. In this same regard, however, one should be sure that the matter under discussion is actually indifferent; "for it is one thing to tolerate the weak in matters indifferent, and quite another in matters blatantly evil." 126 Furthermore, it must be remembered, Luther said, that "it is unchristian to allow ceremonies priority over peace and unity." 126 Love and peace are far more important than all ceremonies, 127 and therefore the Christian ought not allow his exercise of adiaphoristic freedom to become the source of disruptive contention in the Church.
128 Both Luther and Melanchthon admitted that some of the human traditions had been established precisely for the sake of unity and order, and for that reason could still serve a very useful purpose.
129 Such ecclesiastical rites as offer no occasion to sin, therefore, the Augsburg Confession stated, need not be rejected.
180 On the contrary, should any tradition prove profitable for the peace and good order of the Church, it is to be observed, as, for example, , that specific civil laws touching upon adiaphora carried explicitly stated in this same regard that a council has the power to institute some ceremonies, provided that they do not enhance the bishops' tyranny, are useful and profitable to the people, and evidence fine, orderly discipline. Thus, the conciliar decrees concerning times and places of assembly, the hours for preaching, administration of the sacraments, praying, singing, praising and thanking God are indispensable to the survival of the Church. 135 In his diatribe against Karlstadt, Luther claimed that he himself had never forbidden the outward removal of images, so long as it had been done without rioting or uproar and had been authorized by the proper officials. 186 In exercising authority over the realm of adiaphora, the Augsburg Confession stated, the bishops or pastors are simply following the example of St. Paul when he ordained that women should cover their heads in the congregation.
187 Thus, when they do legislate on such matters as the observance of the Sabbath and so forth, they are generally to be obeyed for the sake of charity and peace.
188
In this regard, however, the Augsburg Confession also cautioned authorities to keep two things in mind. First, it must be remembered that what may have been instituted with good reason in an earlier age might not be suitable to later times. 189 Many human traditions have in fact been changed in time, and such a change did not destroy the unity of the Church. 140 In the second place, authorities must remember that it is not necessary that human traditions, rites or ceremonies, be everywhere alike. 141 The true unity of the Church depends rather upon agreement concerning the doctrine of the Gospel and the administration of the anything more than a sub poena obligation, and that much of the actual civil legislation of adiaphora was not, as a matter of fact, considered binding in conscience by many Continental and English Reformers. To that extent, not only CalvhVs but all the Reformers' adiaphoristic thought has an important bearing upon the tradition of a purely penal-law theory that had begun to evolve in the thirteenth century (see M. sacraments. 142 In support of this position, the Reformers referred to the adiaphoristic settlement of the first Easter controversy, cited the incidence of diversity in the early Church as reported in the Tripartite History, and quoted dicta of Pope Gregory I and St. Augustine to the effect that diversity does not violate the unity of the Church and that the unity of the Church does not consist in external human ordinances.
148
In addition to serving the peace and unity of the Christian community, some human traditions, according to Luther and Melanchthon, might also be useful for pedagogical purposes. 144 As Luther repeatedly insisted against the spiritualists, the Christian remains a creature of this world, who as such needs a bridge to the Spirit. In the word and the sacraments, the Spirit has afforded man such a bridge. But the man weak in faith-the plight of every Christian to one extent or another-may need the help of further external aids if he is to take full advantage of the word and the sacraments. 146 Luther referred in this regard to the positive contribution which he said had been made by the pictures contained in his German Bible. These latter, he said, helped the reader better to understand the word he was reading and to recall vividly to his mind the events of Christ's life. He added that images do no more harm on walls than in books, and expressed the desire that the rich and mighty would permit the whole Bible to be painted on houses, inside and out.
146
Luthet's reform of the liturgy proceeded, although not exclusively, with the same pedagogical purpose in mind.
147 Like most of the other mainline Continental Reformers, Luther was also of the conviction that "the need for ritual was in inverse ratio to the earnestness of Christian faith." 148 But he was far less optimistic about the general level of maturity among Christians than were the Zwinglians or, for that matter, even Bucer and Calvin.
149 Thus, while he considered some of the l «Ibid. 143 Part 2, art. 5, pp. 48-49. The papaliets, it may be noted, agreed that in "indifferent things" variety did not destroy the unity of faith (Confutatio pontificia, Reu, op. cit., p. 376). And if, therefore, the Reformers have in mind "special" or "particular" rites, "they are to be praised" for not regarding a variety of rites as separating unity of faith (ibid., p. 353). It was such "special" rites which Gregory and Augustine were speaking of when they upheld diversity (ibid., pp. 376-77). "Universal" Church rites, however, are not indifferent matters, the papalists said, and the Reformers therefore are wrong in not observing them and are in diametrical opposition to Augustine's advice to Januarius that "what has been Universally delivered by the Church must be universally observed" (ibid., pp. Finally, in the exercise of his adiaphoristic freedom the Christian must also, Luther and Melanchthon said, take into account how that freedom can best be put to the service of other members of the community. While, therefore, a matter like clerical celibacy, which Scripture neither commands nor prohibits, is in itself clearly adiaphoristic and not to be imposed as binding upon consciences, 158 the inner law of love may well excite one or another Christian to accept, so far as he is able, 154 a certain limitation upon his freedom to marry in order to serve better the needs of the community. raries, however, it looked more like a labyrinth 166 or a dead-end road.
167
These latter negative impressions were hardly allayed by the fact that in practice the course laid out by the Reformers proved considerably more difficult to negotiate than Luther had predicted. But to say whose impression was the more accurate, the Reformers' own or their critics', must depend ultimately upon the relative merits of the various positions from which their judgments were passed.
1M
This was one of the criticisms leveled against Luther by the aforementioned English trio of More, Fisher, and Henry VIII. In the first place, they accused Luther of contradicting himself. Henry wrote that at one time Luther holds that Christ commanded both the Eucharistie bread and cup to be given to the laity, then he turns around and argues that it is a thing left to every man's discretion (Henry VIH, Assertio, p. 219). "What need have we to contradict him who contradicts himself?" (ibid.). More chimed in with the same refrain. Luther whirls this way and that, he wrote: one time he says that it is lawful for men to decide that water be mixed with the wine at Mass because it is only a rite and a matter unessential to the sacrament, and very shortly thereafter that it is not lawful because it has an evil significance (More, Responsio 1, 432, 422-24). More frequently it is charged that the freedom in adiaphora offered by Luther is simply a devious way of doing away with all the sacraments, laws, customs, rites, and ceremonies of the Church. To Luther's suggestion that the times, hours, places, vestments, and rites pertaining to the Eucharistie celebration are "free," More replied: "AH things are free for you; nor does it make any difference to you where, when, how you offer the sacrifice, whether by night or by day, whether in the light or in darkness, drunk or sober, clothed or naked, clean or filthy, on the altar or on the toilet, you hang-dog knave" (Responsio, p. 187 The reference here is to the opinion of Karlstadt and others on the left, who generally thought that Luther and Melanchthon had failed to follow all the way through on their initial proposals for reform.
